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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Larry Mark Lake appeals from his conviction for felony DUI.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Lake with felony DUI. (R., pp. 90-93.) Lake moved to
suppress evidence, claiming that his traffic stop was not supported by reasonable
suspicion. (R., pp. 106-09.) The district court found the officer saw two ATVs
driving on a road in a residential area, then pull over. (R., pp. 133.1) The officer
approached and saw the ATVs did not have license plates, registrations,
headlights, turn signals, or rearview mirrors. (R., pp. 133-34.) It was getting dark
at that time. (R., p. 134.) The officer then initiated a traffic stop. (R., p. 134.)
Lake, one of the operators of an ATV, was ultimately arrested for DUI. (R., p.
134.) The district court denied the motion to suppress, concluding the traffic stop
was supported by reasonable suspicion the unregistered ATVs were being
operated on a road contrary to vehicle registration laws. (R., pp. 133-38.)
Lake entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the
denial of his motion to suppress. (R., pp. 158-61.) The court entered judgment
and Lake filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp. 169-71; 176-78, 184-87.)

A copy of the district court’s Order on Motion to Suppress is attached to this
brief as an appendix.
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ISSUE
Lake states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Lake’s motion to
suppress?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 4.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Lake argues that the district court erred by not suppressing evidence, but
does so “mindful” that the facts found by the district court (and unchallenged on
appeal) support the district court’s determination that the traffic stop was justified
by reasonable suspicion. Has Lake failed to show error in the denial of his
motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
Lake Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion To Suppress
The district court found that the officer saw both ATVs driving on a road in
a residential area before she initiated the traffic stop. (R., p. 133.) She also saw
the ATVs lacked license plates, lights and other indicia that the vehicles were
legal to operate on that street at that time. (R., pp. 133-36.) Based on these
factual findings the district court concluded that the officer had probable cause to
believe that Lake was illegally operating an unregistered motor vehicle on a
public road under I.C. § 49-426 (limiting use of unregistered ATVs on public
roadways to agricultural purposes). (R., pp. 135-36.) Lake admits that the facts
found by the district court “amount to reasonable suspicion for a lawful traffic
stop,” but nonetheless “argues that the district court erred by denying his motion
to suppress.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-9.) Based on the district court’s decision, a
copy of which is attached and incorporated by reference, and Lake’s
acknowledgement that the traffic stop was lawful, the state submits that Lake has
failed to show error by the district court.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Lake’s conviction for
felony DUI.
DATED this 19th day of February, 2016.

_/s/ Kenneth K. Joregensen_
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 19th day of February, 2016, served a
true and correct digital copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by
emailing the brief to:
JENNY C. SWINFORD
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
briefs@sapd.state.id.us

KKJ/dd

_/s/ Kenneth K. Joregensen
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRIOT COURT

Payette county, Idaho

NOV 1 0 2014
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL ISTRlCT
Bl!'.:Y====~l==~O:!ep~u~ty

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN A}H) FOR THE COUNTY OF PAYETT

STA TE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff:
vs.
LARRY T,AKE,

)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO.

CR-2014-979

ORDER ON MOTION
TO SUPPRESS

)

Defendant.

)

On September 18, 2014, this matter came on for hearing before this Court on the
Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Having received the post-hearing briefing, the Com1 now
issues its findings of facts, conclusions of law, and order.

FINDINGS OF FACT
On May 27, 2014 Fruitland Police Officer Juanita Toll was on patrol duty in the City of
Fruitland, Idaho when she received a dispatch to go to North Utah Street to check out a
complaint ahout three ATV-type vehicles racing. She proceeded westbound on West First Street
towards it's intersection with North Utah, and saw two ATVs, around the 600 block of West
First Street, pull over to the side of the road near a sign. As she approached the ATVs, one of
them circled around into the road and back onto the shoulder where it stopped next to the other
ATV. This location was less than a block from North Utah Street. Neither of the two ATVs
displayed a license plate or registration slicker. Neither had headlights, turns signals, or rearview
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mirrors.

It was already getting dark at that time. This area is exclusively a residential

neighborhood area.
Officer Toll effected a traffic stop, got out of her patrol car, and approached on foot.
Defendant Lake was seated on one of the ATVs with the motor running and in gear, although the
ATV was stationary on the gravel shoulder of West First Street. She asked the two men what
was going on and Lake tried to explain that he had previously had a problem with some hispanic
males in that area attempting to charge him a "toll" to use West First Street, a public road. Less
than a minute into the conversation, Officer Toll asked Lake if he had been drinking and he
answered that he had. After speaking to him some more about the circumstances, Officer Toll
conducted field sobriety tests and eventually arrested Toll for DUI.
The Defendant filed a motion to suppress arguing that Officer Toll had no legal basis for
the traffic stop.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The parties agree that the Defendant was seized when officer Toll parked her patrol car
behind the A TVs and approached. Defendant contends there was no lawfol cause for this
SC1ZlUe.

A traffic stop hy an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's occupants and implicates
the Fomth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Delaware v.

Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1395-96, 59 L.Ed.2d 660,667 (1979); State v.
Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559,561,916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct.App.1996). Under tl1eFom1h
Amendment, an officer may stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal behavior if there is a
reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws.
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, IOI S.Ct. 690, 694-95, 66 L.Ed.2d 621, 628-29
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(1981 ); State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 208, 953 P.2d 645, 648 (Ct.App.1998). The
reasonableness of the suspicion must be evaluated upon the totality of the circumstances at the
time of the stop. State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474,483,988 P.2d 700, 709 (Ct.App.1999). The
reasonable suspicion standard requires less than probable cause but more than mere speculation
or instinct on the part of the officer. Id. An ofilcer may draw reasonable inferences from the facts
in his or her possession, and those inferences may be drawn from the officer's experience and
law enforcement training. State v. Montague, 114 Idaho 319,321,756 P.2d 1083, 1085
(Ct.App.1988). Suspicion will not be found to be justified if the conduct observed by the officer
fell within the broad range of what can be described as normal driving behavior. Atkinson, 128
Idaho at 561, 916 P.2d at 1286. Failing to stop for a stop sign constitutes grounds for a traffic
stop. State v. Tierney, 109 [daho 474,476, 708 P.2d 879,881 (1985).
The power to assess the credibility of wituesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh
evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court State v. Valdez-A,fo/ina, 127
Idaho 102,897 P.2d 993 (1995).
As explained more fully below, the Court concludes that Toll possessed facts sufficient to
support a reasonable suspicion that Lake and the driver of the other A TV were operating the
ATVs contrary to h·affic laws. Specifically, there was a reasonable suspicion that the ATVs
were driven on a public road without being licensed or registered under l.C. § 49-426. That code
section states:
Motorcycles, motorbikes, utility type vehicles and all-terrain vehicles need not be
licensed under the provisions of this chapter or numbered pursuant to the
provisions of section 67-7122, Idaho Code, if they are being used exclusively in
connection with agricultural, hmticultural, dairy and livestock growing and
feeding operations or used exclusively for snow removal purposes. Travel upon
the public highways shall be limited to travel between farm or ranch locations.
Motorcycles, motorbikes, utility type vehicles and all-terrain vehicles used for this
purpose shall meet the emblem requirements of section 49-61_2, Idaho Code.
ORDER ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS
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Defendant argues that Officer Toll never witnessed Lake driving the ATV or even being
on the paved roadway, and there is no requirement that Lake's ATV be registered ifit was
simply parked on the shoulder.
The Court disagrees with Defendant's position. First, the Court notes that Officer Toll
twice testi ficd that she saw both ATVs "pull to the side" prior to seeing one of them (not the one
driven by Lake) pull around into the road and back onto the shoulder. Given these
circumstances, the Cami can infer and find that Toll saw both ATVs moving from the road to the
shoulder. Lake's ATV was not simply parked on the shoulder. Given these findings, Toll had
reasonable grounds to detain the drivers of both ATVs for driving the unregistered ATVs on a
public road. This conclusion is supported by the following authority:
Reed asse1is that when Officer Rouse discovered the tempmmy registration, he
should have waved the vehicle's driver away and then departed instead of
approaching the driver and requesting his driver's license and proof of insurance.
Thus, according to Reed, the Fmuth Amendment was violated when Officer Rouse
continued to detain Reed after the suspicion of a criminal offense was dispelled, and
any evidence obtained through this violation must be suppressed ....
This does not mean, however, that a traffic stop must necessarily be terminated at the
instant the officer's suspicion of criminal activity is extinguished, for legitimate
public interests other than the investigation of crime may justify a brief detention. In
evaluating a Fourth Amendment claim, a balancing test is applied. "(T]he
permissibility of a paiticular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its
intrusion upon the individual's Fomth Amendment interests against its promotion of
legitimate governmental interests." Delaware, 440 U.S. at 654, 99 S.Ct. at 1396. See
also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 878, 95 S.Ct. at 2578-79.
In State v. Godwin, 121 Idaho 491, 826 P.2d 452 (1992), the Idaho Supreme Court
applied this balancing test to determine whether an officer was justified in requesting
Godwin's driver's license even though he was not suspected of any offense. In that
case, an Idaho State police officer had stopped a moto1ist for an equipment violation
when a second vehicle, driven by Godwin, stopped about l 00 yards up the highway.
Another officer, a county deputy sheriff, happened to drive by and stopped behlnd
God\\~n's vehicle. The state police officer informed the deputy that the first motorist
believed her driver's license was in Godwin's vehicle, as she and Godwin were
traveling together. The other motorist's purse was located in Godwin's vehicle, but
her driver's license was not found in it. The deputy then asked Godwin for his
ORDER ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS
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driver's license. A status check of Godwin's license revealed that it had been
suspended, and Godwin was then anested for driving with a suspended license.
During a subsequent invento1y search of his car, a quantity of cocaine was found
under the front seat. Godwin sought to suppress evidence of the cocaine on the
theory that the police officer's request for his license was unreasonable. The Idaho
Supreme Com1 affirmed the denial of Godwin's motion to suppress, holding that "a
police officer's brief detention of a driver to mn a status check on the driver's license,
after making a valid, lawful contact with the driver, is reasonable for purposes of the
fourth amendment." Id. at 495, 826 P.2d at 456. The Comt explained its decision as
follows:
There are several reasons for permitting a police officer to ask for a driver's
license under these circumstances. In making any stop, whether the stop is
to enforce the trqffic lmvs or to cany out the officer's community caretaker
jimction, an officer should be allowed to identify, with certainty, the person
with whom he is dealing. This is necessmy to protect himse/f and other
o,{ficers fi'Oln danger, to accurately prepare any required reports
concerning his contact with the motorist, and to allow the officer to
adequately respond to allegations o,f illegal conduct or improper behavior.
Even if there is a legitimate public interest in requesting a driver's license
and running a status check under the circumstances presented here, that
interest must outweigh the nature of the intrusion in order to pass the Fourth
Amendment test of reasonableness. \Ve note, however, that the intrusion
here was minimal. Godwin was already stopped at the roadside when
Deputy Barbieri arrived. The officer's initial contact with Godwin was to
detcnnine whether he had Whitifield's driver's license. His further request
for Godwin's license and his check on the status of that license constituted a
very limited further encroaclunent upon any privacy interest protected by
the Fourth Amendment. We therefore have little difficulty in concluding
that such a limited intrusion was outweighed by the substantial public
interest which supported Deputy Bmbieri's conduct.
·

Id, quoting the decision of the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Godwin, 121 Idaho
51 7, 520, 826 P.2d 478, 4 81 (Ct.App.1991 )(emphasis in original).
For the reasons stated in Godwin, Officer Rouse's contact with Reed to request his
driver's license met Fomih Amendment standards of reasonableness. After having
made a lawful stop to determine whether Reed's vehicle was registered, Officer
Rouse was entitled to ascertain the driver's identity even though the reason for that
stop had dissipated. This slight prolongation of the traffic stop was a minimal
intrusion and was not so burdensome as to outweigh the public interests, identified in
Godwin, that are served by driver's license checks in these circumstances. '!11e same
may be said for the officer's request to see Reed's certificate of liability insurance.
There is a valid governmental interest in determining whether vehicles driven on
Idaho's streets and highways are insured as required by law, and an officer's request
for proof of insurance following a justified traffic stop adds only minimally to the
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intrusion upon the motorist's privacy interests that are safeguarded by the Fourth
Amendment.

State v. Reed, 129 Idaho 503, 505-06, 927 P.2d 893, 895-96 (Ct. App. 1996).
Here, Officer Toll was entitled to make a traffic stop to investigate the umegistered
ATVs. Before a full minute had expired during her conversation with Lake, the reasonable
suspicion ripened into a DUI investigation when Lake, who was seated on a motor vehicle, in
gear ,,~th the engine running on the shoulder of a public road, admitted to consuming alcohol.
See, e.g., State v. Rocha, 2014 Op. No. 81, Id. Ct. App.
Therefore, for the aforementioned reasons:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED tliat Defendant's Motion to Suppress is DENIED.
-r""'
Dated this _(Q_ day of November, 2014.

~
z:~
Susan E. Wiebe
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

l HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was

/7)

forwarded to the following persons on this

day of November, 2014:

Payette County Prosecuting Attorney
11151'1 Ave. No.
Payette, ID 8366 l
Brett Schiller
717 S. Kimball Ave, Ste 200
Caldwell, ID 83605
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